This is a guest post by Professor David Haig of
the Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology.
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At the meeting of the
Faculty of Arts and Sciences of November 1, 2016 I spoke in favor of the Lewis
motion in these words.
“There is good will on both
sides of this debate. I have three concerns about the current policy.
First
is the issue of consistency. If we sanction students for membership in groups
of which we disapprove, we can less credibly defend the rights of students to
belong to groups of which we approve but are disapproved of by others in
authority in other times and other places.
Second
is the issue of guilt by association and collective punishment. Racial and
religious profiling are commonly justified by statistical associations with
crime. Are we justified in sanctioning all members of female-only and male-only
groups because of statistical associations and the criminal behaviors of some
members of some groups?
Third
is the issue of student autonomy. All our students are members of the College
community whether or not we approve of their choices or opinions. If we believe
in the transformative power of a liberal arts education, and desire the
intellectual, social, and personal transformation of our students, then our
desire should be to achieve these ends by intellectual argument to transform
their hearts and their minds. The current policy attempts to coerce the choices
of students, by changing their self interest, without a fundamental change in
their values. We risk changing the choice without changing the chooser.”
The second of these
concerns referred to a common claim at the time that the policy of sanctioning
members of ‘unrecognized single-gender social organizations’ was directed at
the problem of sexual assault on campus. We now hear less of this justification
for the sanctions policy. I consider my first and third points to be my
principal objections to the policy, particularly the third. The phrases
‘transformative power of a liberal arts education’ and ‘intellectual, social,
and personal transformation’ come from the mission statement of Harvard College
as frequently articulated by Dean Rakesh Khurana. My use of his words was an
attempt to speak to him directly, to beseech him consider that he might be
mistaken.
One of my unspoken concerns
was the question of how the policy would be implemented. My fear of ‘mission
creep’ has been fully justified by the report of the Implementation Committee
that has been accepted by Dean Khurana. The laudable aim of gender-inclusivity
has metamorphosed into a proposal that students seeking certain awards or
offices are required to affirm that they are in compliance with “the College’s
policy regarding the principle of non-discrimination, particularly with regard
to membership in unrecognized single-gender social organizations.” What happens
if a student refuses to take this affirmation on the principle that they are
opposed to such oaths? Would they be in contempt of the College’s policy and
thereby ineligible for the aforementioned awards and offices? What happens if a
student cannot in conscience affirm they are in compliance with the College’s
policy because the student sincerely believes in a different principle of
non-discrimination? Where is the space for dissent? Who determines the
policy and what are the mechanisms of revision? Are there constraints on
unilateral changes (by self-appointed arbiters of student virtue) of the policy
to be affirmed?
I consider the requirement
for such an affirmation to be a dangerous precedent. What if some future
government declared particular kinds of organizations illegal and demanded
oaths of non-membership from all college students. The faculty would be on
firmer ground to resist such demands if it did not require similar oaths from
our students. For these reasons, I have presented a motion to the Faculty that
“This faculty does not
approve of Harvard College requiring a student to make an oath, pledge or
affirmation about whether the student belongs to a particular organization or
category of organizations.”
The motion is deliberately
worded as disapprobation of oaths rather than prohibition of oaths because I
did not want the motion to be complicated by the disputed question of whether
the faculty or the administration has ultimate jurisdiction in this matter. In
a similar vein, the motion does not address the disputed sanctions policy itself
but rather its implementation in the requirement for an affirmation. It might
also be argued that the motion is premature and should be postponed until after
the recently announced committee of review makes its recommendations. I believe
that that committee would benefit from knowing the sense of the faculty on the
question of affirmations before making its recommendations.
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